地方财政体制权责不对称问题研究

地方财政体制权责不对称已经成为分税制后我国地方财政管理体制运行中的一个较为突出的问题。主要表现为：事权划分原则性不强且缺乏法制化基础导致了政府间事权下移，地方政府级次过多与“倒轧账”式的分税模式引起了地方政府间财权上移，转移支付制度不规范造成了地方政府间财力差距日益扩大。为此，我们应选择相应的治理对策来完善我国地方财政体制。     

集群式供应链的竞争力及培育分析

集群式供应链是产业集群和供应链之间的藕合组织形式。本文对集群式供应链这种新型的组织形式和集群式供应链的概念进行了阐述,并对其竞争力及其培育进行分析,为集群式供应链这种新型组织方式的构建研究奠定了基础。     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Price-Cost Margins and Profit Rates in New Zealand Electricity Distribution Networks Since 1994: the Cost of Light Handed Regulation

From 1994 to 2003, New Zealands corporatized electricity lines networks operated with no industry regulator, but under the spotlight of mandatory information disclosure. As a result there exists a large body of detailed, audited and publicly available accounting data on the financial performance of these businesses. Using that data, this paper finds that price-cost margins have widened substantially since deregulation. We estimate the extent to which light-handed regulation has allowed profits to exceed the levels which would have been acceptable under the old rate-of-return regulatory framework, and find that the answer is about $200 million per year, on an ongoing basis.We thank colleagues at Victoria University, and two anonymous referees for this journal, for constructive comments on this paper. Any remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.JEL classification: D21; K23; L11; L43; L51     

Two-settlement Systems for Electricity Markets under Network Uncertainty and Market Power

We analyze welfare and distributional properties of a two-settlement system consisting of a spot market over a two-node network and a single energy forward contract. We formulate and analyze several models which simulate joint dispatch of energy and transmission resources coordinated by a system operator. The spot market is subject to network uncertainty, which we model as a random capacity derating of an important transmission line. Using a duopoly model, we show that even for small probabilities of congestion (derating), forward trading may be substantially reduced, and the market power mitigating effect of forward markets (as shown in Allaz and Vila 1993) may be nullified to a great extent. There is a spot transmission charge reflecting transportation costs from location of generation to a designated hub whose price is the underlying for the forward contract. This alleviates some of the incentive problems associated with the forward market in which spot-market trading is residual. We find that the reduction in forward trading is due to the segregation of the markets in the constrained state, and the absence of natural incentives for generators to commit to more aggressive behavior in the spot market (the strategic substitutes effect). In our analysis, we find that the standard assumption of no-arbitrage across forward and spot markets leads to very little contract coverage, even for the case with no congestion. We present an alternative view of the market where limited intertemporal arbitrage enables temporal price discrimination by competing duopolists. In this framework, we assume that all of the demand shows up in the forward market (or that the market is cleared against an accurate forecast of the demand), and the forward price is determined using a market clearing condition.     

供应链竞争环境分析模型

本文将扩展后的波特模型用于分析供应链上几个连续环节组成的整体的竞争环境以及环节间的整合趋势。并采用新的模型分析了实现“厂网分离、竞价上网”改革后的电力供应链的竞争状态与发展趋势。     

控制火电厂二氧化硫排放的有效途径——排污权交易

目前,我国工业二氧化硫排放量中有42%是火电厂排放的,因此高效控制火电厂的二氧化硫排放是提高空气质量的主要途径。美国利用排污权交易治理火电厂的二氧化硫排放取得了巨大的成功,不仅二氧化硫排放量大幅下降,而且排污权交易也被证明是成本最低的方法。借鉴美国的经验,可以为我国治理火电厂二氧化硫排放提供高效途径。     

美国大型企业制度的变迁与我国民营企业转型

从19世纪40年代到该世纪末,美国企业顺利完成了现代管理革命:所有权与经营权正式分离,职业经理人出现并日趋职业化。目前,我国的民营企业正在实施转型。本文以美国企业制度变迁的历史为鉴,并结合当时的政策与环境进行分析,最后给出了我国民营企业转型的思路。     

CEO任期、CEO权力集中度与中国制造企业自主创新能力——基于中国制造业上市公司2006—2017年的经验证据

本文以中国制造业上市公司2006—2017年数据为研究对象,以CEO权力集中度为调节变量探讨了CEO任期与中国制造企业自主创新能力之间的关系,研究发现:①长期意义上CEO任期越长,越有利于自主创新能力提升;②CEO权力集中度越高,越有利于自主创新能力提升;③CEO权力集中度与CEO任期有"伴随效应",能够扩张CEO任期对自主创新能力的正向效应,正所谓"用人不疑,疑人不用";④在当前,国有制造企业更应注重CEO任期对自主创新能力的积极作用,应考虑增加国企CEO任期;而民营制造企业要注重公司治理结构中CEO权力集中度。结论具有稳健性。     

上市公司股权结构与财务报告舞弊关系分析

经理人员对上市公司的内部控制已不能完全解释上市公司的财务报告舞弊问题，大股东控制了上市公司，通过对上市公司的利益侵占获取私人收益，财务报告舞弊是隐瞒大股东行为的手段。本文以截至到2005年受到证监会处罚的上市公司为样本，分析了股权结构与财务报告舞弊的相关性，从股权制衡与培育大股东诚信义务方面提出了治理大股东行为的建议。